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United States v. McCane: Judge Tymkovich Questions 
Heller’s Disarming Dicta 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Just how far does the Supreme Court’s recent holding in District 
of Columbia v. Heller1 go to protect what it deems to be the 
individual right to bear arms for self-defense? In Heller, the Court 
states that “nothing in our opinions should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession by felons.”2 The 
Tenth Circuit recently challenged this now famous dictum in United 
States v. McCane,3 in which the criminal defendant, charged with 
being a felon in possession of a handgun, asserted that Heller’s 
individual right to bear arms invalidated the constitutional basis of 
the felon dispossession law. 
Though McCane’s conviction was upheld, the concurring 
opinion of Judge Tymkovich illustrates a growing scholarly and 
judicial dissatisfaction with Heller’s ostensibly unprincipled 
exceptions. This Note addresses both the holding in McCane and the 
broader question of whether the exceptions articulated in Heller can 
be sustained in light of the Court’s recognition of an individual right 
to bear arms.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
On the evening of April 18, 2007, Officer Aaron Ulmann, of the 
Oklahoma City Police Department, observed Markice Lavert 
McCane, a convicted felon, straddling two eastbound lanes of a four-
lane highway in Oklahoma City.4 The officer followed McCane for 
three city blocks before stopping McCane for violating state traffic 
law and because the officer suspected McCane was intoxicated.5  
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer asked McCane for his 
 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 2816–17. 
 3. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 4. Id. at 1039. 
 5. Id. 
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license and insurance information, whereupon McCane informed the 
officer that he was driving under a suspended license.6 The officer 
then requested that McCane accompany him to his patrol car. 
McCane complied with the officer’s request.7 Upon exiting the 
vehicle, McCane was subjected to a pat-down search and was then 
placed in the back seat of the patrol car.8 McCane’s driver’s-side 
door remained open for the duration of the stop.9 
With McCane in the back of the patrol car, the officer performed 
a records check, confirming that McCane’s license was suspended 
and that the car he was driving was not registered to him.10 The 
officer arrested McCane, placed him in handcuffs, and summoned a 
towing service to tow the vehicle.11 He then returned to the car and 
asked McCane’s passenger, Joseph Carr, to accompany him back to 
the patrol car. The officer then searched the car.12 
In the pocket of the driver’s-side door, hidden underneath a rag, 
the officer found a .25 caliber pistol with seven rounds of 
ammunition in the magazine.13 The officer brought the weapon to 
the patrol car to secure it, and, upon seeing the gun, McCane said, 
“I forgot that was even there.”14 The officer then advised McCane of 
his Miranda rights15 and transported him to the police station for 
booking.16 While in police custody, McCane declined to make any 
further statement.17 The officer cited McCane for driving with a 
suspended license and for straddling lane lines.18 McCane was then 
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession 
of a firearm.19 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 16. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1039. 
 17. United States v. McCane, No. CR-07-286-C, 2008 WL 2740926, at *1 (W.D. 
Okla. July 10, 2008) (“Defendant said that he understood his rights, but he refused to waive 
his right to counsel and to talk to the officer about the incident.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states:  
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in 
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B. Procedural History 
McCane sought to suppress both his inculpatory statement (“I 
forgot that was even there”) and the gun.20 He began by arguing 
that Officer Ulmann’s traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment 
and therefore any evidence from that stop was inadmissible.21 The 
argument proceeded as follows: In United States v. Botero-Ospina,22 
the Tenth Circuit adopted the rule that “a traffic stop is valid under 
the Fourth Amendment if . . . based on an observed traffic violation 
or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that  
a . . .  violation . . . is occurring.”23 Further, under the Supreme 
Court’s decision Terry v. Ohio,24 the reasonableness of McCane’s 
stop must be (1) “justified at its inception” and (2) “reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
in the first place.”25 McCane claimed that road construction at the 
time of his traffic stop warranted deviation from his lane.26 He 
further argued that the statutory prohibition against departure from 
one’s lane in Oklahoma grants the driver a degree of discretion, 
allowing drivers to depart from their lane when reason and safety 
require them to do so.27 In short, McCane argued that “rather than 
being a careless, reckless driver [McCane] was being most careful 
and prudent.”28 McCane claimed that because he was driving in a 
 
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to 
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce. 
 20. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040. 
 21. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress at 11, McCane, 2008 WL 
2740926 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2008) (No. CR-07-286-C), 2008 WL 6807798. 
 22. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 23. Id.; see Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 21, at 8. 
 24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 25. Id. at 20. 
 26. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 21, at 2 (“The 
officer claimed that the basis for the stop was straddling the eastbound center lane line for 
three blocks. This ‘alleged offense’ by the officer’s description occurred in the construction 
areas which affected the lane position of every driver.”). 
 27. Id. at 6; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-309(1) (West 2009) (“A vehicle 
shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.”) (emphasis added). 
 28. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 21, at 11. In 
support of this proposition, McCane cited a Tenth Circuit decision interpreting an almost 
identical Utah law. In Unites States v. Gregory, the Tenth Circuit stated, “We do not find that 
an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway is a violation of 
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reasonable manner and in compliance with the law, the traffic stop 
was not justified at inception, and thus violated McCane’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
McCane likewise sought to suppress his statement, “I forgot that 
was even there,” by claiming that the statement was involuntary and 
coerced.29 McCane noted that the government is prohibited from 
using any coerced statement against him.30 In order to determine 
whether a statement is coerced, courts must consider “the totality of 
all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation.”31 McCane contended 
that because the officer placed McCane in a squad car and then 
presented McCane with the gun prior to reading him his Miranda 
rights, the officer had elicited McCane’s statement through “[s]ubtle 
psychological isolation coercion.”32 Because the officer elicited this 
statement in such an ostensibly insidious form of coercion, the 
statement, argued McCane, ought not to be admitted. 
District Judge Robin J. Cauthron issued the court’s decision on 
July 10, 2008, upholding in every particular the government’s 
charges against McCane.33 With regard to McCane’s contention that 
his statement was psychologically coerced, Judge Cauthron stated 
that “[h]aving heard and considered the parties’ evidence, it is clear 
that the government has met its burden of showing that Defendant’s 
statement was voluntary.”34 She credited Officer Ulmann’s testimony 
that McCane “spontaneously uttered this statement in the absence of 
questioning” and concluded that “[u]nder the totality of the 
circumstances, Defendant’s statement was not the result of 
coercion.”35 
The court likewise dismissed McCane’s contention that the 
traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment stating, “it is clear that 
Officer Ulman had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
 
Utah law. . . . [T]he statute requires only that the vehicle remain entirely in a single lane ‘as 
nearly as practical.’” 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 29. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Jackson-Denno Hearing at 3, United States v. 
McCane,  2008 WL 2740926 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2008) (No. CR-07-286-C), 2008 WL 
6807799. 
 30. Id.; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1977). 
 31. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
 32. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Jackson-Denno Hearing, supra note 29, at 2. 
 33. McCane, 2008 WL 2740926, at *1–*4. 
 34. Id. at *2. 
 35. Id. 
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undertake a traffic stop.”36 As to McCane’s claims that road 
construction necessitated his lane deviation, Judge Cauthron 
observed that “Officer Ulman, who has extensive experience with the 
area of Oklahoma City where Defendant was pulled over, testified 
that while currently there are road construction zones on N.E. 23rd 
Street, there was not construction underway in this area on the night 
of April 18, 2007.”37 
As to the officer’s warrantless search of McCane’s car, the court 
observed that the search “did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as 
it was a search incident to lawful arrest.”38 Under the “longstanding” 
search incident to lawful arrest (“SILA”) exception, “the 
government is entitled to a contemporaneous reasonable search 
which may extend to objects under the arrestee’s immediate 
control.”39 Further, this exception applies to “containers found 
within an arrested defendant’s vehicle as well as the passenger 
compartment.”40 Importantly, under the then prevailing Fourth 
Amendment regime of New York v. Belton,41 officers were permitted 
to rely upon the SILA exception, even after a suspect had been 
restrained.42 Thus, because McCane’s statement was not viewed as 
having been coerced, because the officer had an articulable reason to 
pull McCane over, and because the search of McCane’s car was 
lawful under the then prevailing understanding of the SILA 
exception, McCane’s statement and the gun and ammunition found 
by Officer Ulmann were admitted into evidence; McCane was 
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).43 McCane then appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
 
 36. Id. at *3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *4. 
 39. Id. (citing Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741, 744 (10th Cir. 1967)). 
 40. Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)). 
 41. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 42. McCane, 2008 WL 2740926, at *4 (citing United States v. Brothers, 438 F.3d 
1068, 1073 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Belton rule applied when the search was 
conducted within a few minutes of the defendant’s lawful arrest and the defendant had not yet 
been removed from the scene)). 
 43. Judge Cauthron’s decision did not address McCane’s contention that the element of 
movement through “interstate commerce” had not been established. See McCane, 2008 WL 
2740926. Presumably the judge found the evidence presented by the government to be 
sufficient. See Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Quash and Dismiss 
Indictment, McCane, 2008 WL 2740926 (No. CR-07-286-C), 2008 WL 6807800 (6807798 
is the Defendant’s Motion). 
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C. Interim Decisions 
Significant to the trial court’s determination of the admissibility 
of evidence against McCane was the determination at trial that a 
warrantless search of a suspect’s car conducted while the suspect was 
handcuffed in the back of a patrol car was subject to the SILA 
exception. Of course, it goes without saying that the constitutional 
validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was likewise essential for 
upholding McCane’s conviction. While McCane’s conviction was up 
for appeal, the United States Supreme Court issued two opinions 
that called into question both of the propositions above. 
1. Arizona v. Gant44 
The first of these was Arizona v. Gant,45 in which the Supreme 
Court reexamined its holding in New York v. Belton.46 In Belton, the 
Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial 
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.”47 The Court applied this rule 
despite the fact that the defendants had been removed from the car 
and could not possibly have reached within the car to tamper with 
evidence.48  
The Gant Court further refined the rule introduced in Belton. 
Like McCane, Gant was secured in a police patrol car prior to the 
police conducting a search of his vehicle.49 The officers then searched 
Gant’s car, finding both a gun and bag of cocaine.50 The Supreme 
Court invalidated this search, stating that “[p]olice may search a 
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time 
of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”51 Thus, because Gant was not 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment during the 
 
 44. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 47. Id. at 460. 
 48. Id. at 456. 
 49. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1723. 
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search, and because the evidence searched for was not related to 
Gant’s arrest, the search of the passenger compartment violated the 
Fourth Amendment.52 
2. District of Columbia v. Heller53 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,54 the Supreme Court struck 
down several District of Columbia statutes generally prohibiting the 
possession of handguns and requiring that lawfully owned firearms 
be “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar 
device” unless they are being used for recreation or are in a place of 
business.55 The Court ruled that “the District’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its 
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home 
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”56 In so doing, 
the Court abandoned a longstanding rationale of the Second 
Amendment as a “collective” right. The Court stated that 
“[n]owhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the 
people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”57 The 
Court further stated, “[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of 
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an 
individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not 
unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was 
not.”58  
Among those limits upon the individual right to bear arms 
sustained by the Court, albeit in dicta, is the prohibition on firearm 
possession by felons. Perhaps anticipating that the recognition of an 
individual right to bear arms would create a sea-change in Second 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Heller Court stated that nothing in 
its “opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”59  
 
 52. See id. at 1723–24. 
 53. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2783 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 56. Id. at 2821–22. 
 57. Id. at 2790. 
 58. Id. at 2799. 
 59. Id. at 2816–17. 
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III. MCCANE IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
In light of the decisions above, McCane argued on appeal that 
his conviction could no longer be constitutionally sustained. He 
argued that “it would be improper to give less relief to Markice 
McCane than to Rodney Gant,”60 noting that “[i]n essence once the 
individual is handcuffed in the back of the police car it appears any 
justification to conduct a search incident to arrest has ceased to 
exist.”61 McCane contended that, because under Gant a 
constitutional violation had occurred, the evidence obtained through 
this violation ought to have been excluded in light of the 
exclusionary rule.  
McCane further argued that the Supreme Court’s complete 
repudiation of the “collective right” understanding of the Second 
Amendment in Heller, and its recognition of the individual right to 
bear arms in self-defense, necessarily calls into question the 
constitutional validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).62 He stated: 
[I]t is important to stress the nature of the right being asserted 
herein as a Constitutional right, which exists innately, which is 
merely recited in, not provided by the Second Amendment. 
Moreover, the language of the Second Amendment clearly states 
this right “shall not be infringed.” This is an absolute prohibition, 
clear in both language and meaning, leav[ing] no ambiguity to be 
resolved.63 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The Tenth Circuit upheld the McCane conviction in every 
particular. In response to McCane’s characterization of the Gant 
ruling and the exclusionary rule, the Tenth Circuit observed that 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, but contains no provision 
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
 
 60. Supplemental Response Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 12, United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-6235), 2009 WL 1433750. 
 61. Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 9, McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (No. 08-
6235), 2009 WL 1388417. 
 62. Amended Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 24–25, McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (No. 
08-6235), 2009 WL 108600. 
 63. Id. at 28.  
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commands.”64 The court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
United States v. Leon, which created the “good-faith” exception to 
the exclusionary rule in which courts decline “to apply the 
exclusionary rule when police reasonably and in good faith relied 
upon a warrant subsequently declared invalid.”65 Thus, the court 
“decline[d] to apply the exclusionary rule when law enforcement 
officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon the settled case 
law.”66 
The court likewise made short work of McCane’s invitation to 
call into question the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In response 
to McCane’s insistence that the dispossession law could not be 
constitutionally sustained in light of Heller, the Tenth Circuit merely 
responded by recapitulating the Heller dictum: “[N]othing in our 
opinion” said the Heller Court, “should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”67  
B. Judge Tymkovich’s Concurrence 
Judge Tymkovich wrote a separate concurrence, unwilling to let 
a felony dispossession case pass by without observing the difficulty 
created by Heller’s dicta. He cited two reasons for drafting a 
concurrence: “The first is to note, given the undeveloped history of 
felon dispossession laws, the possible tension between Heller’s 
dictum and its underlying holding. The second reason is to express 
concern that the dictum inhibits lower courts from exploring the 
contours of Heller and its application to firearm restrictions.”68 
As to the first concern, Judge Tymkovich observed that “the 
felon dispossession dictum may lack the ‘longstanding’ historical 
basis that Heller ascribes to it.”69 Though several scholars, cited by 
Judge Tymkovich, had argued that felony dispossession laws have a 
long and distinguished history,70 recent scholarship suggests that this 
 
 64. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 65. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)).  
 66. Id. at 1045. 
 67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008). 
 68. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1047–48 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. at 1048. 
 70. See Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of 
Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and 
the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 203, 266 (1983). 
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historical characterization of such laws is incorrect.71 Judge 
Tymkovich continues, observing that “[t]his uncertain historical 
evidence is problematic in light of Heller’s Second Amendment 
interpretation. Central to the Court’s holding are a detailed textual 
analysis and a comprehensive review of the Second Amendment’s 
meaning at the time of its adoption.”72 
Next, Judge Tymkovich addresses his concern that the Supreme 
Court’s “summary treatment of felon dispossession in dictum 
forecloses the possibility of a more sophisticated interpretation of § 
922(g)(1)’s scope.”73 Though Judge Tymkovich does not say so, this 
is particularly true in the Tenth Circuit where the court considers 
itself “bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the 
Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and 
not enfeebled by later statements.”74 
Left unencumbered by what Judge Tymkovich refers to as “deus 
ex machina dicta,” the lower courts may have been able to address 
other questions unanswered by the Heller decision (e.g., whether 
individual gun ownership for the purpose of self-defense should be 
elevated to a fundamental individual right, to what level of 
constitutional scrutiny will laws regulating such ownership be 
subjected, etc.).75 This question has already sparked serious scholarly 
debate.76  
Finally, Judge Tymkovich observes that Heller has, at least 
tacitly, undermined the holding of at least one Tenth Circuit 
opinion. In United States v. Baer,77 the Tenth Circuit observed that 
 
 71. C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 695, 709–10, 714 (2009); id. at 698–713 (comprehensively reviewing the history of 
state and federal dispossession laws); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch 22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1551, 1561, 1563 (2009). 
 72. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1048 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 1049. 
 74. Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
 75. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049–50 (“[T]he existence of on-point dicta regarding 
various regulations short-circuits at least some of the analysis and refinement that would 
otherwise take place in the lower courts.”). 
 76. Judge Tymkovich cites the following articles as illustrative: Carlton F.W. Larson, 
Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1379–82 (2009); Marshall, supra note 71, at 728–31; Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and 
a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009).  
 77. 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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“the circuits have consistently upheld the constitutionality of federal 
weapons regulations like section 922(g) absent evidence that they in 
any way affect the maintenance of a well regulated militia.”78 If  
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) can only be upheld in light of a “collective 
right” view of gun ownership like the one discredited in Heller, then 
the governing rationale for the law in several circuits may have been 
severely undermined. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Upholding the admission of evidence against McCane, even in 
light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in Gant rendering 
the circumstances of Officer Ulmann’s search unconstitutional, 
seems uncontroversial in light of the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Nothing in the facts of this case suggests that the 
officer’s actions were taken in anything but “objectively reasonable 
reliance upon the settled case law,”79 thus placing his actions squarely 
within the good faith exception. Of greater interest in this case is 
Judge Tymkovich’s concurrence, which illustrates the growing 
judicial and scholarly dissatisfaction with Heller’s sweeping dicta 
protecting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from review. 
A. Uneven Application: Violent v. Non-Violent Felons 
Perhaps no one will lament Markice McCane’s inability to own a 
gun. The trial court credited statements by the government that 
McCane was a “multi-convicted felon and former gang member.”80 
Judge Tymkovich observed that “[e]very individual right has 
exceptions, of course, and the application of § 922(g) to a violent 
felon such as Mr. McCane would appear appropriate under any 
Second Amendment reading.”81 For this reason, even if the Tenth 
Circuit were to ignore the dicta of the Supreme Court and question 
the validity of § 922(g) in light of Heller, the present case is 
undoubtedly an improper vehicle for doing so. 
The concern with the felon dispossession law is not rooted in a 
scholarly and judicial desire to see greater armament of violent 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044. 
 80. United States v. McCane, No. CR-07-286-C, 2008 WL 2740926, at *1 (W.D. 
Okla. July 10, 2008). 
 81. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049. 
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criminals. Rather, the Heller dicta comes under fire because  
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) encompasses “non-violent felons as well, 
permanently restricting their Second Amendment right to self-
defense.”82 The over-inclusiveness of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is 
thrown into stark relief by examining the circumstances in which 
criminals with a proven propensity to use firearms irresponsibly are 
shielded from the statute’s lifelong ownership ban. 
Consider first the case of nonviolent felons. Why would we think 
that a tax evader, an embezzler, or someone who bribed a public 
official would be more likely to commit acts of gun violence? . . . 
And even with respect to violent criminals, the exception is 
sweepingly broad. . . . [Further], there is the problem of gun 
misconduct that does not rise to the level of a felony, such as 
recklessly firing a gun into the air, or leaving a loaded firearm in a 
location easily accessible to a child. These offenders have 
demonstrated a prior misuse of firearms, but are not prohibited 
from future possession.83  
In light of Heller’s recognition of an individual right to bear 
arms in self-defense, the application of § 922 seems uneven, as it 
vitiates the self-protection right of those who pose no greater 
apparent or empirically quantified risk of gun violence than non-
felons, while allowing those with a propensity to misuse firearms to 
own them without impediment. 
B. Orbiter Dictum 
Having identified this apparent unevenness, Judge Tymkovich 
laments his and any other court’s ability to call into question the 
Heller dictum. Quoting Professor Lawson, Judge Tymkovich agrees 
that “[a]lthough [Heller’s] exceptions are dicta, they are dicta of the 
strongest sort.”84 As Judge Tymkovich notes, the Heller dictum is 
particularly strong because it “is recent and not enfeebled by later 
statements.”85 
The McCane case thus illustrates a salient feature of Tenth 
Circuit jurisprudence, i.e., the extraordinary deference the court 
gives to Supreme Court dicta. Though other circuits treat Supreme 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Larson, supra note 76, at 1380–81. 
 84. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Larson, supra note 76, at 1372). 
 85. Id. at 1047 (quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
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Court dicta as persuasive authority,86 the Tenth Circuit’s view is 
fairly sweeping: “[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme 
Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings.”87 
Perhaps for this reason, Judge Tymkovich observes that “a number 
of commentators have considered and proposed . . . the proper level 
of constitutional scrutiny,”88 without articulating a view on what the 
proper level of constitutional scrutiny should be. Though there 
seems little question that McCane is an improper vehicle for 
exploring the boundaries of the Heller dictum, it has nevertheless 
invited criticism that may have been enhanced by a clear statement—
the first such statement by a federal appellate judge—as to what level 
of constitutional scrutiny the right to bear arms for personal self-
defense merits. Judicial economy strongly favors a deferential posture 
to Supreme Court dicta, preventing unnecessary challenges to the 
settled views of the court. However, if Justice Scalia’s Heller dictum 
must enjoy repose from lower court criticism, it must do so in direct 
contradiction of Scalia’s prior statements. “Dictum settles nothing,” 
said Justice Scalia, “even in the court that utters it.”89 
C. Constitutional Scrutiny 
Judge Tymkovich cites several scholars who have articulated 
views on the level of constitutional scrutiny that restrictions on the 
right to bear arms, post-Heller, ought to enjoy.90 The mode of 
analysis in these papers has been to consider what level of scrutiny 
would allow the Heller exceptions, while at the same time making 
the District of Columbia handgun ban unconstitutional. However, 
several of these scholarly efforts have focused not simply on 
determining what the appropriate standard of review is, but on 
 
 86. Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2008) (“We are 
mindful that dicta of the U.S. Supreme Court, although non-binding, should have considerable 
persuasive value in the inferior courts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. 
Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Although the Committee is doubtless correct 
that the Supreme Court's dicta are not binding on us, we do not view it lightly.”). 
 87. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 88. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049. 
 89.  Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 352 n.12 (2005). 
 90. See Larson, supra note 76, at 1379–82; Marshall, supra note 71, at 709–10, 714; 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, 
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 82–84 
(2009); Volokh, supra note 76. 
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“reverse engineer[ing]” what standard the Heller court applied to 
both the individual gun right and its exceptions.91 At bottom, the 
standard explored by these scholars was one in which the handgun 
ban would be struck down while its exceptions, like the felon 
dispossession law, would be upheld. This approach, while preserving 
both the holding and dicta of Heller, seems unnecessary. The Heller 
Court stated that “the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms” and compared this right to the First 
Amendment right of freedom of speech.92 The Court further 
acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution leaves the District of 
Columbia a variety of tools for combating that problem, including 
some measures regulating handguns . . . . But the enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the 
table.”93 Because the Heller Court elevates the Second Amendment 
to the level of an individual right, it seems logical to conclude that 
laws restricting that right ought be subjected to a heightened level of 
scrutiny. This notion seems consistent with the suggestion of 
footnote four of the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. 
Carolene Products, which states that “[t]here may be narrower scope 
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of 
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments.”94 If, 
for example, strict scrutiny were to operate upon laws regulating gun 
ownership and use, then such regulations would have to be (1) 
narrowly tailored in order to (2) serve a compelling government 
interest. While there is little question that keeping guns out of the 
hands of criminals in order to ensure public safety is a compelling 
government interest, there is likewise little question that the absolute 
ban on felon gun possession sweeps in non-violent felons unlikely to 
misuse firearms, and excludes misdemeanants whose prior 
convictions have already demonstrated their willingness to use 
firearms dangerously.95 Consequently, the holding of Heller may, as 
Judge Tymkovich suggests, call into question the validity of the 
statutes supported by the Heller dictum. If gun ownership is to be 
protected as an individual right and not a collective right, then the 
 
 91. Larson, supra note 76, at 1372. 
 92. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008). 
 93. Id. at 2822. 
 94. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 95. Larson, supra note 76, at 1380–82. 
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laws regulating gun ownership may have to be retooled to better 
conform to Heller’s core holding. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The recognition of an individual right to bear arms in the Second 
Amendment represents a dramatic departure from a long-held view 
that the Second Amendment creates a collective right. Enshrining 
the Second Amendment as an individual right and not a collective 
right may ultimately necessitate reevaluation of the rationales 
supporting the lawful regulation of gun ownership and use.  
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